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This note reconsiders the model of Morris and Shin (2002). We show that when the random variable of 
interest is generated by two independent pieces of uncertainty, there are multiple equilibria. Moreover, the 
social welfare is increasing in the precision of the public information.
I. Introduction
In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (2002) study the interaction of public information 
and private information in a setting with features of a beauty contest type. In their model, 
agents use both the public and the private information to get close not only to the target 
but also to the average action of other agents. Public information helps them to achieve both 
objectives whereas private information may lead them away from the average action of others. 
Thus agents tend to downplay their private information, putting too much weight on public 
information. As a result, social welfare may decrease when the public information gets more 
accurate. 
In this paper, we extend their analysis to a case where the underlying random variable of 
interest is generated by two independent components, and each agent can choose which of the 
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two components to investigate. We retain most of the original notations. 
II. Analysis
1. The Setup
Let  be the underlying random variable of interest. We consider the case where the variable 
 is a sum of two independent components:
We assume that the two random variables  and  are independently (written as ), 
distributed normal random variables:  and  where  and 
 are precision of  and , respectively. All random variables in this paper are normally 
distributed.
Morris and Shin use improper prior of  , which simplifies calculations a 
great deal. In their model the assumption of the improper prior does not cause any trouble 
because they are interested only in the conditional distributions of random variables. We cannot 
utilize the convenience of the improper prior since we need to compute unconditional means 
as well. 
The public information , which will be known to everyone in the economy at no cost, is a 
signal about the first component . So, we posit
Here,  is independent of random variables  . We will denote the error 
term associated with a random variable  by  and its precision by hs  , so that . 
All error terms are assumed to be independent of each other. 
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We consider public information as something like announcing quarterly unemployment 
data. Public information of this sort may provide agents with some idea where the economy 
is headed. Yet, it will not be directly applicable when agents are interested in using the 
information to trade in the stock market, for example. To be able to take a full advantage of 
the information, they will typically need to acquire more information about the stock market 
reaction to the public information. That information about the stock market is represented by 
the orthogonal random variable .    
Each agent in the economy can acquire private information about  or . We assume that 
each agent can acquire only one piece of information, probably because of the cost of getting 
additional information. Specifically, agent i can acquire either signal  or signal , which are 
defined by
Here, ,  for all i≠j, and  , for all i and j with i≠j. Thus signal  
provides information about , and signal  provides information about . If agents acquire 
private information  , they are getting more information about the same component that 
public information deals with. If they acquire information , they are getting information about 
a component that public information does not provide any clue to. We assume  
for all i where s=x, z. Note that precision of each signal does not depend on the identity of 
agent who acquires it.
As in Morris and Shin, agent i chooses his action ai to maximize preferences given by:
 (P)
They showed that the optimal solution is given by:
  
160  經營論集, 第50卷 統合號
We can use the same formula here as well.
2. Benchmark Case
If there is only public information without any private information, each agent’s forecast of  
will be based on the prior distribution of  and the public information : 
Define 
The variable h is the combined precision of the prior of  and the public information .  
III. All Agents Acquiring Private Information of the Same Type
We start with the case where all agents acquire the same kind of private information. If all 
agents acquire information x, then their forecast of  is given by:
It is straightforward to see that when all agents acquire information x, the optimal action of 
an agent is given by the following formula.  
Since 
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 ,
the term in the bracket in the expression (P) of preferences get cancelled out. Thus, we have:
Similarly, if all agents acquire private information only about z, each agent gets an expected 
utility of
Comparing the two, we arrive at:
It is straightforward to show that for fixed values of hw, hx and hz, there is only one positive 
root  to the following equation:
Thus,  holds if and only if . It is also easy to show that  if and 
only if  . Thus agents will switch to information z only when the public information is 
accurate enough relative to the prior information on w. In other words, if public information 
alone is very accurate, then acquiring more information on u is not necessary, so agents switch 
to acquiring information on w. 
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Note that the fact  does not guarantee that acquiring information z rather 
than x is an equilibrium because computations of Ui(z) and Ui(x) are based on the assumption 
that all agents acquire the same information. To tell whether all agents will acquire information 
z or x, we need to check whether each agent has incentives to deviate and get a different kind 
of information when all the other agents acquire the same kind of information.
1. Deviation
Suppose that it is known that all the other agents in the economy are acquiring information 
x. If an agent deviates and acquires information z, how much will he get? Since all other agents 
are using information x, the average action a– is given by
Note that the action of the deviant agent does not enter the picture because he is so small. 
Therefore, the deviant agent’s action is given by the formula , or
Recall the definition of v. Thus, the deviant agent gets:
For other agents, we have:
Therefore,
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From this, we can compute the deviating agent’s expected utility as follows:
Compute Uj(x) and we get the following:
Thus by deviating, the agent gets, relative to non-deviation:
From this we get:
Thus deviation does not pay only when h is low enough to satisfy the following 
 (Dx)
As long as this inequality holds true, agents acquiring information x is an equilibrium. 
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Similarly, we can show that all agents acquiring information z is an equilibrium if and only if 
the following inequality holds:
 (Dz)
2. Acquisition of Different Private Information by Agents of Positive Measure
Now, let’s consider whether there is a sort of mixed strategy equilibrium. Suppose that 
agents of measure  acquires information x and the remaining agents of measure  
acquires information z. 
Then, since the two groups of agents have different expectations, we have:
Thus those who acquire information x see this as: 
And those who acquire information z see this as:
Using the formula
we can compute the optimal action of each agent. For those who acquires information x:
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For those who acquires information z:
The average action is given by
From this, we can compute the expected utility of each group of agents. Below the subscript 
m refers to the fact that a m fraction of agents are acquiring information x.
and
             
The difference between the two is given by
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For this to be an equilibrium, there must be an  that equalizes the two expected 
utilities:  . Since the expression in the bracket is strictly decreasing in m, the 
following two conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of the mixed strategy 
equilibrium:
Note that the first condition is identical to the condition (Dz) that all agents acquiring 
information z is an equilibrium and the second condition is identical to condition (Dx) that all 
agents acquiring information x is an equilibrium. Therefore, the mixed equilibrium exists only 
when conditions (Dx) and (Dz) both are satisfied.
Proposition: There are two critical values of h, called  and  such that 
(a) If , all agents acquiring information x is the unique equilibrium.
(b) If , then all agents acquiring information z is the unique equilibrium.
(c)  If , there are three types of equilibrium. All agents acquiring either information 
x or z only is an equilibrium. All agents playing a mixed strategy of getting information 
x with a probability  is also an equilibrium.





It is easy to see fx(-(1-r)hx)>0, f 'x (-(1-r)hx)>0 and fx(0)>0. Thus, equation fx(h)=0 has 
 Cheol Park  167
only one positive solution. Call it h**. Also, since fz(h) is quadratic with a positive coefficient on 
h2, and fz(0)<0, there is only one positive solution to equation fz(h)=0. Call it h
*. One can also 
show h*< h**. Note that all agents acquiring information x is an equilibrium if and only if h< h**, 
and all agents acquiring information w is an equilibrium if and only if h> h*. Since h*< h**. 
Acquiring either information is an equilibrium if h∈[h*, h**]. The mixed strategy constitutes an 
equilibrium only when both are equilibrium. Thus the conclusion follows.
3. Social Welfare
We now compute the social welfare associated with each equilibrium. One can show:
and 
It is obvious that the social welfare is increasing in the precision of the public information 
represented by the variable h.
IV. Conclusion
This note shows that when the uncertainty is generated by two dimensional random 
variables, the conclusions of Morris and Shin (2002) do not follow. While this may be 
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indicative of the robustness of their results, how the mixed strategy equilibrium is actually 
obtained in an economy with many agents. More work needs to be done in this regard.
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